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ABSTRACT
Trademark issues are frequently litigated in the United States Patent and
Trademark Office, yet circuits were previously divided on how much weight to give
those decisions. The Supreme Court provided the answer. B&B Hardware v. Hargis
Indus. held that in certain circumstances, the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
will have a preclusive effect on federal district courts. This comment looks at what
effect this ruling will have on trademark litigation in district courts by examining the
cases that caused the circuit split leading up to the Supreme Court’s decision.
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ISSUE PRECLUSION: THE EFFECT B&B HARDWARE WILL HAVE ON
TRADEMARK LITIGATION
LIAN OSIER*
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine you are attempting to register the mark FINN for watches with the
United States Patent and Trademark Office (hereinafter “USPTO”). Business X
opposes the application stating your mark is likely to cause confusion with its mark
PHIN. The Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (hereinafter “TTAB”) determines a
likelihood of confusion exists between the two marks and refuses your application.
Business X subsequently sues you in district court for trademark infringement of its
PHIN mark arguing that you are precluded from defending the infringement claim
because of the TTAB’s decision. Pursuant to the Supreme Court’s decision in B&B
Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries,1 are you precluded from defending the
trademark infringement suit?
Alternatively, imagine you are trying to register the mark RUNNING MAN for
t-shirts with the USPTO. Business X opposes the application on the grounds that
your mark is likely to cause confusion with its RUNNING MALE mark. The TTAB
does not find a likelihood of confusion and rules in your favor. Business X is now
suing you in district court for trademark infringement. The district court disregards
the TTAB’s decision and finds in favor of Business X. In light of the Supreme Court’s
ruling in B&B Hardware is this allowed?
These are the questions this comment seeks to answer. Part I of this comment
provides an overview of the trademark registration process, the tests for likelihood of
confusion, and the Supreme Court’s holding in B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus.,
135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015). Part II of this article will analyze B&B Hardware’s ruling by
applying it to prior cases to see if under B&B Hardware the outcome would have
changed. Part III proposes strategies for making a TTAB decision preclusive or not
preclusive in district court. This section also poses some questions on how B&B
Hardware might apply to other types of proceedings and venues.

* © Lian Osier 2016. Candidate for Juris Doctor, The John Marshall Law School, 2016; B.A.
American Studies & Computer Applications, University of Notre Dame, 2013. I would like to thank
Maureen Smith for her help and guidance on this comment and her ability to ask the tough
questions. I would also like to thank Professor Maureen B. Collins for teaching me how to be a
better writer. Finally, I would like to thank Adam Ernette for his unwavering support.
1 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015). In B&B Hardware, the Supreme Court stated “a court should give
preclusive effect to TTAB decisions if ordinary elements of issue preclusion are met.” Id. at 1299.
“If a mark owner uses its mark in ways that are materially the same as the usages included in its
registration application, then the TTAB is deciding the same likelihood of confusion as a district
court in infringement litigation.” Id. at 1308.
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II. BACKGROUND
A. Trademark Registration
Congress enacted the Lanham Act “to protect . . . registered marks used
in . . . commerce . . . [and] to protect such person engaged in such commerce against
unfair competition.”2 The Lanham Act gives valuable rights and benefits to owners
who register their trademarks with the USPTO.3 Federal registration of a
trademark provides “prima facie evidence of the validity of the [mark’s]
registration . . . and the owner’s exclusive right to use the registered mark in
commerce.”4 In order to register a mark, an applicant must file an application with
the USPTO.5 An applicant is required to state when the applicant first used the
mark and with what goods the mark is used. 6 Pursuant to the Lanham Act, the
USPTO cannot register a mark which “so resembles a mark [already] registered in
the [US]PTO . . . as to be likely . . . to cause confusion, or to cause mistake or
deceive.”7
If the USPTO determines a mark may be registrable, it is published in the
Official Gazette.8 Parties who believe that they will be damaged by the applicant’s
mark can oppose the registration by filing a statement with the USPTO showing why
they would be damaged by the applicant’s mark. 9 Opposition proceedings are heard
before the TTAB.10 TTAB opposition proceedings are heard by administrative judges
and high-ranking officials at the USPTO. 11 The TTAB often faces the issue of
likelihood of confusion pursuant to Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act. 12 Opposition

2 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). The main purpose of trademark law is “to protect the public so it may
be confident that, in purchasing a product bearing a particular trademark which it favorably knows,
it will get the product which it asks for and wants to get.” H.R. REP. NO. 219, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 2
(1945).
3 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 19:3 at
19-21 (4th ed. 2010). “A trademark is any word, name, symbol or device, or any combination thereof
used . . . to identify and distinguish his or her goods . . . and to indicate the source of the goods.”
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (LEXIS 2006).
4 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b) (2002).
5 15 U.S.C. § 1051 (2002). The application must contain “the date of the applicant’s first use of
the mark, the date of the applicant’s first use of the mark in commerce, the goods in connection with
which the mark is used, and a drawing of the mark.” Id. § 1051(a)(2).
6 15 U.S.C. § 1051(a)(2) (2002).
7 15 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2006) (emphasis added).
8 15 U.S.C. § 1062 (2000); see also 37 C.F.R. 2.80 (2014).
9 37 C.F.R. 2.101(a); see also 37 C.F.R. 2.104 (2014). Parties have thirty days from publication
to the Official Gazette to file their opposition. 15 U.S.C. § 1063(a) (2006). If no successful opposition
is made, applicant’s mark is registered. Id. § 1063(b)(1).
10 15 U.S.C. § 1067 (2008).
11 Id. § 1067(b) (2008).
The TTAB consists of administrative trademark judges and
high-ranking PTO officials, including the Director of the PTO and the Commissioner of Trademarks.
Id. § 1067(b). Opposition proceedings are generally heard by panels of three judges. 37 C.F.R.
2.129. See Pamela Chestek, B&B Hardware and Ex Parte Appeal, 105 Trademark Rep. 810, 922
(2015) (stating the TTAB affirms the examiners’ decisions 85% to 90% of the time).
12 See 15 U.S.C. § 1063 (2006).
In opposition proceedings, opposers can raise likelihood of
confusion as a reason for denying applicant’s registration.
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proceedings are called inter partes proceedings.13 Inter partes proceedings are
similar in many respects to civil proceedings conducted in federal district courts with
the main difference being the TTAB conducts its hearings on a written record. 14
These proceedings are governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the
Federal Rules of Evidence.15
B. Appealing TTAB Decisions
After the TTAB renders its decision, any party that is dissatisfied can appeal to
the Federal Circuit.16 Appeals to the Federal Circuit are done on the “closed
administrative record and no new evidence is permitted.”17
A party may alternatively appeal a TTAB decision to a district court. 18 By
appealing to a district court, parties can present new evidence, add dilution and
infringement claims, and seek injunctive or monetary relief. 19 Where new evidence
is introduced in a district court appeal, the Lanham Act mandates de novo review.20
When reviewing a TTAB decision, district courts have the authority to determine
whether registration should be granted or whether registration should be
cancelled.21
C. Likelihood of Confusion: TTAB v. Federal Court
Section 2(d) of the Lanham Act governs when likelihood of confusion is the basis
for an opposition proceeding.22 The TTAB uses the analysis laid out by the Federal

13

2007).

Rosenruist-Gestao E. Servicos LDA v. Virgin Enterprises Ltd., 511 F.3d 437, 443 (4th Cir.

14 U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFFICE, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL
BOARD MANUAL OF PROCEDURE § 102.03 (July 2015) [hereinafter TBMP]; Brief for The United
States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioner, B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc.,
135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015) (No. 13-352), 2014 U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 3229, at *10. “In other words,
there is no live testimony.” B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1300 (2015).
15 37 C.F.R. 2.116(a), 2.123, 2.122(f), 2.129 (2007). Parties are allowed written discovery and
depositions and then appear before the TTAB to orally argue.
16 15 U.S.C. § 1071 (2011); Gillette Co. v. “42” Products, Ltd., 435 F.2d 1114 (9th Cir. 1970)
(holding “an appeal to the Federal Circuit can only be made with the mutual consent of all the
parties”). If a party has acquiesced in an appeal to the Federal Circuit, it cannot also have the
TTAB decision reviewed in a federal district court. 15 U.S.C. § 1071(a)(1) (2011).
17 CAE, Inc. v. Clean Air Engineering, Inc., 267 F.3d 660, 673 (7th Cir. 2001).
18 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b) (2011); 1 ANNE GILSON LALONDE & JEROME GILSON, GILSON ON
TRADEMARKS, § 9.04 (Matthew Bender).
19 Alexandra H. Bistline, Raising the Stakes: Trademark Litigation In The Wake of B&B
Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc., 105 Trademark Rep. 867, 923 (2015); see also CAE,
267 F.3d at 673 (stating appeals to the district court is an appeal and a new action where parties can
request additional relief and submit new evidence).
20 Kappos v. Hyatt, 132 S. Ct. 1690, 1701 (2012) (ruling that “if new evidence is present . . . the
district court must make de novo factual findings that take account of the new evidence and the
administrative record before the [US]PTO”).
21 15 U.S.C. § 1071(b)(1) (2011); 15 U.S.C. § 1119 (2000).
22 16 U.S.C. § 1052(d) (2006).
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Circuit in In re E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co.23 to determine whether a likelihood of
confusion exists.24 The DuPont analysis considers thirteen factors among which are
similarity of marks, similarity of goods, channels of trade, fame of the prior mark,
and actual confusion.25 Not every factor needs to be considered in every case; only
those that are relevant need to be considered. 26 When weighing the factors, the
TTAB considers the two marks as set forth in the application’s identification of goods
and services.27 “Likelihood of confusion must be determined based on an analysis of
the mark as applied to the . . . [goods or] services recited in applicant’s
application . . . rather than what the evidence shows the . . . [goods or] services to
be.”28 The important factors under DuPont are similarities of the mark and, when
applicable, similarity of the goods.29
476 F.2d 1357 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
Stone Lion Capital Partners, L.P. v. Lion Capital, LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 1319 (Fed. Cir. 2014);
see also Hon. Gerard Rogers, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, IPO Annual Meeting: TTAB
Update and Implications of B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc. for Corporations
(September 29, 2015) (explaining the TTAB conducts its proceedings according to the precedent laid
out by the Federal Circuit).
25 In re E.I. Du Pont de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 1361 (C.C.P.A. 1973). The thirteen
factors considered by the Federal Circuit are:
(i) the similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance,
sound, connotation and commercial impression; (ii) similarity of dissimilarity and
nature of the goods or services as described in an application or registration or in
connection with which a prior mark is in use; (iii) the similarity or dissimilarity of
established, likely-to-continue trade channels; (iv) the conditions under which and
buyers to whom sales are made, i.e. “impulse” vs. careful, sophisticated
purchasing; (v) the fame of the prior mark; (vi) the number and nature of similar
marks in use on similar goods; (vii) the nature and extent of any actual confusion;
(viii) the length of time during and conditions under which there are been
concurrent use without evidence of actual confusion; (ix) the variety of goods on
which a mark is or is not used; (x) the market interface between applicant and the
owner of a prior mark; (xi) the extent to which applicant has a right to exclude
others from use of its mark on its goods; (xii) the extent of potential confusion, i.e.
whether de minimis or substantial; (xiii) any other established fact probative of
the effect of use.
Id. Likelihood of confusion is determined on a case-specific basis. Id.
26 In re Dixie Restaurants, Inc., 105 F.3d 1405, 1406-07 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (stating only factors of
significance to the particular mark are considered); see also In re Shell Oil Co., 992 F.2d 1204, 1206
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (stating there is no bright line test for likelihood of confusion and each case requires
weighing of the facts and circumstances of the particular mark); DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361-62;
3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 23:79 (4th ed.
2010).
27 Hon. Gerard Rogers, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, IPO Annual Meeting: TTAB Update
and Implications of B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc. for Corporations (September 29,
2015). In standard character marks the TTAB assumes the marks can appear in every possible
style or font. Id. When looking at goods and services identified will be marketed in all possible
ways to all possible buyers and that the goods range from very cheap to expensive. Id.
Traditionally, the TTAB “analyzes the marks, goods, and channels of trade only as set forth in
the [applicant’s] application and in the opposer’s registration, regardless of what the actual usage of
the marks by either party differs.” Brief for The United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Petitioner, B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015) (No. 13-352), 2014
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 3229, at *39.
28 Canadian Imperial Bank v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A, 811 F.2d 1490, 1493 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
29 B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1302 (2015); see also In re Martin’s
Famous Pastry Shoppe, Inc., 748 F.2d 1565, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (ruling Courts evaluating the
23
24
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While the TTAB relies on the DuPont analysis, district courts use the analysis
laid out by their respective circuits. 30 The factors of each circuit’s likelihood of
confusion analysis are generally a variation of Section 731 of the 1938 Restatement of
Torts.31
The factors relevant to all circuits are: (i) strength of the mark,
(ii) similarity between the marks, (iii) actual confusion, (iv) intent, (v) channels of
trade, (vi) sophistication of buyers, and (vii) similarities of goods and services. 32 No
one factor is determinative and each must be considered. 33 The most important
factors are the similarity of the marks and similarity of goods and services. 34
D. TTAB Decisions in Federal Court Litigation
Prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling in B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries,
the circuit courts were split on whether decisions rendered by the TTAB were ever
preclusive in later trademark infringement actions. 35 The general belief was that
TTAB rulings would not be binding in trademark infringement proceedings in
district courts because the TTAB was limited only to the question of whether
registration should be granted.36 The Third and Seventh Circuits, however, applied
issue preclusion to TTAB decisions. 37 The Second Circuit was willing to give issue

similarity of marks requires an examination of “appearance, sound, connotation, and commercial
impression of the two marks”); In Re National Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(explaining that the TTAB may give greater or lesser weight to a specific factor or particular feature
of a mark).
30 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 21:20
(4th ed. 2010).
31 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 23:19
(4th ed. 2010).
32 Restatement First of Torts § 731 (1938).
See Pignons S.A. de Mecanique de Precision v.
Polaroid Corp., 657 F.2d 482, 487 (1st Cir. 1981); Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elecs. Corp.,
287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961); Interpace Corp. v. Lapp, Inc., 721 F.2d 460, 462-63 (3d Cir. 1983);
Sara Lee Corp. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 81 F.3d 455, 463-64 (4th Cir. 1996); Oreck Corp. v. U.S. Floor
Systems, Inc., 803 F.2d 166, 170 (5th Cir. 1986); Frisch’s Restaurants v. Elby’s Big Boy,
670 F.2d 642, 648 (6th Cir. 1982); Helene Curtis Indus., Inc. v. Church & Dwight Co., 560 F.2d 1325,
1330 (7th Cir. 1977); SquirtCo v. Seven-Up Co., 628 F.2d 1086, 1091 (8th Cir. 1980); AMF Inc. v.
Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979); Sally Beauty Co. v. BeautyCo, Inc.,
304 F.3d 964, 972 (10th Cir. 2002); Frehling Enters., Inc. v. Int’l Select Grp., Inc., 192 F.3d 1330,
1335 (11th Cir. 1999).
33 Boston Athletic Ass’n v. Sullivan, 867 F.2d 22, 29 (1st Cir. 1989).
34 A&H Sportswear, Inc. v. Victoria’s Secret Stores, Inc., 237 F.3d 198, 216 (3d Cir. 2000); Reno
Air Racing Ass’n v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1137 (9th Cir. 2006) (explaining that the two marks
should be compared as they “are encountered in the marketplace and the circumstances surround
the purchase”).
35 Bistline, supra note 19, at 869-70.
36 Hon. Gerard Rogers, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, IPO Annual Meeting: TTAB Update
and Implications of B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc. for Corporations (September 29,
2015).
37 See Jean Alexander Cosmetics, Inc. v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 458 F.3d 244, 255 (3d Cir. 2006)
(finding that TTAB’s decision provided preclusive effect in a later infringement litigation), with EZ
Loader Boat Trailers, Inc. v Coz Trailers, Inc., 746 F.2d 375, 378-379 (7th Cir. 1984) (finding issue
preclusion where the TTAB considered marketplace use) and C&N Corp. v. Kane, 953 F. Supp. 2d
903, 913-14 (E.D. Wis. 2013) (stating TTAB’s determination of likelihood of confusion was entitled to
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preclusion in certain circumstances.38 In contrast, the Fifth, Eleventh, Ninth, and
D.C. Circuits held that the TTAB’s decision could never be preclusive. 39 Specifically,
the Fifth Circuit stated that because the Lanham Act “include[s] a provision by
which a federal district court can ‘look beneath and beyond the record’ before the
[US]PTO through de novo review of a TTAB decision [it] indicate[d] a ‘congressional
intent not to invoke the immunizing doctrines of res judicata or collateral
estoppel.’”40
E. B&B Hardware Decision
In B&B Hardware, the Supreme Court addressed the issue of whether a district
court should apply issue preclusion to a TTAB decision regarding likelihood of
confusion.41 B&B Hardware had a federal registration in the mark SEALTIGHT for
“threaded or unthreaded metal fasteners and other related hardwar[e]; namely,
self-sealing nuts, bolts, screws, rivets, and washers, all having a captive O-ring, for
use in the aerospace industry.”42 Hargis was attempting to register its SEALTITE
mark for “self-piercing and self-drilling metal screws for use in the manufacture of
metal and post-frame buildings” with the USPTO. 43 When the USPTO published
Hargis’ mark, B&B Hardware opposed the mark on the grounds that it was likely to
cause confusion with its mark. 44 At the same time as the opposition proceeding,
B&B Hardware sued Hargis in the United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Arkansas alleging SEALTITE infringed on its federally registered

preclusive effect where it met the elements of issue preclusion and the issue of likelihood of
confusion was the same).
38 Bistline, supra note 19, 873; see also Beam Brands Co. v. Beamish & Crawford, Ltd.,
937 F.2d 729 (2d Cir. 1991) (holding where marketplace use is considered, issue preclusion could be
possible); see also Levy v. Kosher Overseers Ass’n of Am., Inc., 104 F.3d 8, 42-43 (2d Cir. 1997)
(stating TTAB decisions are not preclusive where the TTAB “relied solely on a visual examination of
the two marks” and did not examine the “entire marketplace” of the marks in dispute).
39 See Am. Heritage Life, Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Insurance Co., 494 F.2d 3, 9 (5th Cir. 1974);
see also Dita, Inc. v. Mendez, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135856, *12-13 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 14, 2010)
(stating TTAB proceedings do not preclude infringement because of the plain language of the
Lanham Act); see also Freedom Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Way, 757 F.2d 1176 (11th Cir. 1985)
(explaining Congressional intent was that TTAB decisions were not preclusive because the Lanham
Act provides for extensive judicial involvement in trademarks and the option to hear appeals on a de
novo basis); see also Aktieselskabet AF 21. November 2001 v. Fame Jeans Inc., 525 F.3d 8, 12-13
(D.C. Cir. 2008) (holding the D.C. Circuit to factual findings of the TTAB but will not give them
preclusive effect).
40 Bistline, supra note 19, 876-877; Am. Heritage, 494 F.2d at 9-10; Bonner v. City of Prichard,
661 F.2d 1206, 1207 (11th Cir. 1981) (holding “that the decisions of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit . . . as the court existed on September 30, 1981, handed down by that
court prior to the close of business on that date, shall be binding as precedent in the Eleventh
Circuit”).
41 B&B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1299.
42 SEALTIGHT, Registration No. 1,797,509.
43 SEALTITE, U.S. Trademark Application Serial No. 75,129,229 (filed July 2, 1996).
44 Opposition Proceeding No. 911556787 (filed February 28, 2004).
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SEALTIGHT mark.45 The TTAB ruled in favor of B&B Hardware.46 B&B Hardware
argued before the district court that TTAB’s finding of a likelihood of confusion was
preclusive.47 The District Court rejected B&B’s argument, determined the TTAB’s
decision was not preclusive, found that there was no likelihood of confusion, and
entered a verdict in favor of Hargis. 48 On appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the
District Court’s decision.49
The Supreme Court reversed the Eighth Circuit’s decision and held that “a court
should give preclusive effect to TTAB decisions if [the] ordinary elements of issue
preclusion are met.”50 The Supreme Court concluded that nothing in the Lanham
Act prohibits issue preclusion from applying in these cases. 51 The opinion noted
procedures used by the TTAB are not “fundamentally, poor, cursory, or unfair” but

45 Brief for The New York Intellectual Property Law Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents, B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015) (No. 13-352), 2014
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 3823, at * 6.
46 B&B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1299 (determining that in the USPTO Hargis’ SEALTITE mark
should not be registered).
47 Brief for The New York Intellectual Property Law Association as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents, B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1293 (2015) (No. 13-352), 2014
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 3823, at * 6.
48 B&B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1302. The District Court reasoned that “the TTAB is not an
Article III Court.” Id.
49 B&B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1302. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision
on the grounds that the “TTAB uses different factors . . . [and] places too much emphasis on the
appearance and sound of the two marks.” Id. Additionally, Hargis bore the burden of persuasion
before the TTAB while B&B bore it before the district court. Id.
It is important to note Judge Colloton’s dissent in the Eighth Circuit’s opinion. Judge Colloton
noted that “[t]he courts have generally been too ready to deny preclusive status to findings of the
[TTAB].” Stephen Baird, Winthrop & Weinstine, West LegalEdcenter Webcast: B&B Hardware v.
Hargis (May 8, 2015).
The [TTAB’s] function is to determine whether there is a right to secure or to
maintain a registration. If in the course of doing so factual issues are decided
there is no policy reason why those factual questions should not be foreclosed from
further re-litigation in court as long as the issues in the two cases are indeed
identical and the other rules of collateral estoppel are carefully observed.
Id. (citing 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 32:99
(4th ed. 2013)).
50 B&B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1299. “When an issue of fact or law is actually litigated and
determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is essential to the judgment, the
determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties whether on the same or a
different claim.”
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1980); see Bobby v. Bies,
556 U.S. 825, 834 (2009); New Hampshire v. Main, 532 U.S. 742, 748-749 (2001); Baker v. General
Motors Corp., 522 U.S. 222, 233 (1998).
Issue preclusion applies when “the issues in the two cases are indeed identical and the other
rules of collateral estoppel are carefully observed.” 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 32:99 at 32-244 (4th ed. 2010).
51 B&B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1305. “Absent a contrary indication, Congress intends that an
agency’s determination has preclusive effect.” Id. The TTAB’s decision was rendered in a judicial
capacity, parties were given an adequate opportunity to litigate—discovery, testimony, oral
arguments, and de novo review are available to parties, and nothing in the Lanham Act indicates
Congress wanted to preclude preclusion. Katherine Basile, Reed Smith LLP, IPO Annual Meeting:
TTAB Update and Implications of B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc. for Corporations
(September 29, 2015).
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are “exactly the same as in federal court.”52 Much like district courts, the TTAB has
adopted and follows the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.53 Additionally, the party
opposing the trademark application bears the burden of proof much like in district
court litigation where the party alleging infringement bears the burden of proof. 54
Furthermore, the Supreme Court stated that the fact that the TTAB and the
circuit courts use “different factors to assess likelihood of confusion” does not prevent
issue preclusion.55 The likelihood of confusion factors used by the TTAB are not
fundamentally different than those used in the circuit courts for “purposes of
infringement,” and there is no reason that a district judge “in the same case should
apply two separate standards of likelihood of confusion.” 56
The Supreme Court expanded upon this and left us with this rule: “If a mark
owner uses its mark in ways that are materially the same as the usages included in
its registration application, then the TTAB is deciding the same likelihood of
confusion as a district court.”57 Conversely, “if a mark owner uses its mark in ways
that are materially unlike the usages in its application, then the TTAB is not
deciding the same issue.”58 “If the TTAB does not consider the marketplace usage of
the parties’ marks, the TTAB’s decisions should ‘have no later preclusive effect in a
suit where actual usage in the marketplace is the paramount issue.’” 59 It is
important to note Justice Ginsburg’s concurrence.60 Justice Ginsburg agreed with
the majority, but stressed the point that “for a great many registration decisions
issue preclusion . . . will not apply.”61

B&B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1309; see 37 C.F.R. 2.116(a), 2.122(a) (2007).
B&B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1309; see also TBMP, supra note 14, § 101.02 (stating “except as
otherwise provided, and where applicable and appropriate, procedure and practice in inter partes
proceedings shall be governed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure”).
54 B&B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1309; see also 37 C.F.R. § 2.116(b) (2007). Hargis tried to argue
that issue preclusion should not apply because the stakes for registration are lower than in
infringement proceedings. B&B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1309. The Supreme Court rejected this
argument stating “the benefits of registration are substantial” as they provide validity of the mark’s
registration and registration is a prerequisite for a mark becoming “incontestable.” Id. at 1310. The
Court further states that “Congress determined that . . . ‘trademarks should receive nationally the
greatest protection that can be given them’ and that ‘[a]mong the new protections created by the
Lanham Act were the statutory provisions that allow a federally registered mark to become
incontestable.” Id. at 1310 (quoting S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1946)).
55 B&B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1307.
56 Id. The Court clarified that “the operative language [of the likelihood of confusion tests are]
essentially the same . . . , the likelihood-of-confusion analysis that Congress used in [the] Lanham
Act provisions has been central to trademark registration since 1881 . . . , [and] district courts can
cancel registrations during infringement, just as they can adjudicate infringement in suits seeking
judicial review of registration decisions. Id.
57 Id. at 1308. This is when issue preclusion would apply.
58 Id. In this situation, there would be no issue preclusion.
59 Id.
(quoting 6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR
COMPETITION, § 32:101 at 32-246 (4th ed. 2010)). “Usages set out in an application and the use of a
mark in the marketplace do not create different issues.” Id.
60 B&B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. 1293 at 1310 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).
61 Id. Justice Ginsburg states this is because opposed registrations are generally decided by
“compar[ing] the marks in the abstract and [separate] from their marketplace usage.” Id. (citing
6 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 32:101 at 32:247
(4th ed. 2014)).
52
53
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III. ANALYSIS
This section looks at cases from the Fifth, Eleventh and Second circuits and
analyzes them in light of the B&B Hardware ruling. These circuits previously held
that TTAB decisions were not preclusive on district court litigation.
A. Fifth Circuit
The Fifth Circuit held that a finding before the TTAB is not deserving of
preclusive effect in later Lanham Act suits. 62 American Heritage Life Insurance
Company v. Heritage Life Insurance Company involved two life insurance companies’
registrations of the service HERITAGE. 63 American Heritage Life Insurance
Company (“AHLIC”) began using its service mark in commerce in 1957 in connection
with life and disability insurance.64 Heritage Life Insurance Company (“HLIC”)
began using its service mark in commerce in 1958, also in connection with life and
disability insurance.65 In 1960, HLIC filed an application with the USPTO to
register its HERITAGE service mark and AHLIC subsequently opposed the
registration on the grounds that it had priority in its AMERICAN HERITAGE and
HERITAGE trademarks.66
The TTAB sustained the opposition and refused to register HLIC’s mark. 67
After both parties’ testimony and HLIC’s concession that AHLIC first used the
mark,68 the TTAB ruled that HERITAGE was used arbitrarily and both parties were
using the mark on identical services. 69 HLIC attempted to argue that the two marks
were distinguishable because the Insurance Commissioner of each state has “a duty
to protect the public from confusion” and they allowed both companies to use the
word HERITAGE while operating in the same states. 70 The TTAB rejected this
argument stating “Insurance Commissioners . . . ruling[s] as to likelihood of
confusion . . . is in no way binding on the [TTAB].” 71
AHLIC subsequently brought suit against HLIC for trademark infringement. 72
AHLIC argued HLIC was barred under collateral estoppel from defending this action
because of the TTAB’s decision in the opposition proceeding.73 The District Court for
62 Am. Heritage, 494 F.2d at 10; Elizabeth D. Lauzon, Preclusive Effect of Trademark Trial and
Appeal Board’s Finding in Later Lanham Act Suit, 21 A.L.R. Fed 2d 561, *5 (2015).
63 494 F.2d 3 (5th Cir. 1974).
64 Am. Heritage, 494 F.2d at 8; Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co.,
143 U.S.P.Q. 44, 45 (TTAB 1964).
65 Am. Heritage, 494 F.2d at 7; Am. Heritage, 143 U.S.P.Q. at 45.
66 Am. Heritage, 494 F.2d at 7; Am. Heritage, 143 U.S.P.Q. at 46.
67 Am. Heritage, 143 U.S.P.Q. at 45.
68 Am. Heritage, 143 U.S.P.Q. at 45-46 (conceding that AHLIC was the senior user of
HERITAGE and that both companies used the mark on identical services).
69 Id. at 46.
70 Id.
71 Id.
The TTAB further stated that likelihood of confusion was not the grounds for this
opposition proceeding, therefore the lack of actual confusion is irrelevant. Id.
72 Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 1972 US. Dist. LEXIS 12159, *1 (S.D.
Tex. August 30, 1972).
73 Id. at *21.

[15:257 2016]

Issue Preclusion: The Effect B&B Hardware
will have on Trademark Litigation

267

the Southern District of Texas ruled that collateral estoppel did not apply because
the TTAB’s decision “only established that [HLIC] was not entitled to registration of
the . . . mark HERITAGE.”74 The district court further stated that AHLIC failed to
prove likelihood of confusion and dismissed the matter. 75
Following the district court’s decision, both parties appealed to the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit.76 The Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling
that HLIC was not barred under collateral estoppel from defending this action. 77
The court explained, “a claim for service mark [or trademark] . . . infringement and a
claim for registration present different questions of law and fact . . . and in substance
the causes of action are not the same.” 78 The Fifth Circuit continued its reasoning by
stating, “Congress has given federal court[s] the power to look beneath and beyond
the record” before the TTAB.”79
If the B&B Hardware ruling had been binding on the Fifth Circuit when
deciding American Heritage Life Insurance Company v. Heritage Life Insurance
Company, the outcome would not have changed. TTAB decisions are preclusive “so
long as other ordinary elements of issue preclusion are met [and] when the usages
adjudicated by the TTAB are materially the same as those before the district
court.”80 Specifically, when the “TTAB does not consider the marketplace usage of
the parties’ mark” it should not have preclusive effect in a later litigation suit where
marketplace usage is the main issue. 81 The main issue before the TTAB was
whether there was priority in the service mark HERITAGE. 82 In contrast, the main
issue before the Southern District of Texas was likelihood of confusion. 83 The
TTAB’s resolution of the issue of priority did not involve consideration of actual
marketplace usage, but rather who was the senior user of the service mark
HERITAGE.84 In its analysis, the TTAB did not go through the DuPont analysis to
determine if there was a likelihood of confusion. 85 While the TTAB’s decision was
rendered in a judicial capacity and a final judgment was reached, both parties were
not given a fair opportunity to litigate the issue of likelihood of confusion before the
TTAB.86 Since the same issue was not being litigated in each respective forum, the
ruling in B&B Hardware would not have changed the outcome of this case. 87

Id.
Id. at *25.
76 Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life. Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 3 (5th Cir. 1974).
77 Id. at 13.
78 Id. at 8.
79 Id. at 11. However, the Fifth Circuit stated that TTAB determinations should still be given
great weigh unless “the contrary is established by evidence.” Id. at 11-12.
80 B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1310 (2015).
81 Id. at 1308.
82 Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life. Ins. Co., 143 U.S.P.Q. 44, 45 (TTAB 1964).
83 Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 1972 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12159 (S.D. Tex.
August 30, 1972).
84 See generally Am. Heritage, 143 U.S.P.Q. 44 (TTAB 1964).
85 Id.
86 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 (1980).
87 In its opinion, the Fifth Circuit noted that the “[two] causes of action are not the same” and
issue preclusion of the TTAB’s decision would not apply. Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life.
Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 3, 8 (5th Cir. 1974).
74
75
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B. Eleventh Circuit
The Eleventh Circuit considered whether the TTAB’s decision was preclusive in
Freedom S&L Association v. Way.88 This case involved two parties’ registration of
the service mark FREEDOM. Freedom Savings and Loan Assoc. (“Freedom
Savings”) is the owner of the FREEDOM mark used in connection with savings and
loan association services.89 Vernon Way (“Way”) opened his real estate office under
the name Freedom Realty Company.90 Way subsequently filed an application with
the USPTO to register his service mark FREEDOM REALTY in connection with real
estate brokerage services.91 Freedom Savings opposed the mark on the grounds that
Way’s mark “so resembles [its’] mark as to be likely to cause confusion.”92
After reviewing the record,93 the TTAB sustained Freedom Savings’ opposition
and refused to register Way’s FREEDOM REALTY mark.94 The TTAB looked at the
two marks as a whole and determined that Way’s mark was not “so distinctive as to
aid in differentiating between their [two] marks . . . to avoid their being confused.”95
In its reasoning, the TTAB considered the services offered by Way and Freedom
Savings.96 Although the TTAB found differences between the parties’ respective
services, it determined that Freedom Savings offered “services which pertain in some
way to real estate transactions . . . services which go hand-in-glove.”97 The TTAB
concluded a reasonable person would “be confused into believing the parties . . . are
in some way related to each other” and refused Way’s registration. 98
After the TTAB’s decision, Way began operating under the name “Vernon Way’s
Freedom Realty” and Freedom Savings brought an action against him for trademark

757 F.2d 1176 (11th Cir. 1985).
FREEDOM, Reg. No. 1,034,458. Freedom Savings’ FREEDOM mark depicts the word
FREEDOM on a “red and white banner logo, similar to a flag.” Freedom Sav. Loan Ass’n v. Way,
757 F.2d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 1985).
90 Freedom Sav., 757 F.2d at 1179.
91 FREEDOM REALTY, Serial No. 156,919 (filed January 30, 1978). The FREEDOM REALTY
mark consists of the words FREEDOM REALTY with a red, white, and blue eagle and shield.
Freedom Sav., 757 F.2d at 1183.
92 Freedom Federal Sav. & Loan Assoc. v. Vernon Way, Jr., 217 U.S.P.Q. 971, 972 (TTAB 1981).
Freedom Savings also opposed the registration on the grounds that Way’s mark “consists
of . . . matter which may falsely suggest a connection with opposer.” Id.
93 The record before the TTAB consisted of pleadings, Way’s application file, Federal Savings
FREEDOM registration, discovery requests and responses to requests for admissions, and both
parties’ oral arguments. Freedom Federal Sav., 217 U.S.P.Q. at 972. Additionally, Way admitted
that Freedom Savings owned the FREEDOM mark but denied that there was a likelihood of
confusion between the two parties’ marks. Id.
94 Id. at 973.
95 Id. The TTAB went on to state that this would be especially true because “the marks are not
encountered [in] a side-by-side display” but requires one to recall “a previously encountered mark for
comparison.” Id.
96 Id.
97 Freedom Federal Sav., 217 U.S.P.Q. at 973. The inquiry is not whether both parties are
offering identical services, but “whether members of the public who are being served might believe
that there is a relationship between the services performed . . . that it might be assumed . . . that
those services emanate from . . . or are . . . associated with a single source.” Id.
98 Id.
88
89
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infringement.99 Freedom Savings argued that the TTAB proceedings “conclusively
resolved the service mark infringement claim.” 100 However, the District Court for
the Middle District of Florida disagreed and instead granted Way’s motion in limine,
which forbade any reference to the TTAB’s decision. 101 The district court then went
through the likelihood of confusion analysis, 102 and determined that there was no
likelihood of confusion between Freedom Savings’ FREEDOM mark and Way’s
business name.103 The district court explained that nothing was similar about the
two marks except the word “Freedom” and no part of the design suggested a
connection between the two businesses. 104
Freedom Savings appealed the district court’s decision to the Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals.105 The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision
stating that “in this Circuit, a court hearing a [trademark] infringement claim is not
legally and conclusively bound by a prior decision of the TTAB.” 106 After weighing
the likelihood of confusion factors, the Eleventh Circuit concluded that there was no
likelihood of confusion between the two marks. 107 The court reasoned that the TTAB
failed to “compare overall design or . . . relative weakness of the marks.”108 Freedom
Savings and Way did not offer the same services under the mark FREEDOM. 109
Additionally, the two parties operate in very different facilities. 110
Analyzing Federal Saving & Loan Association v. Way under the B&B Hardware
ruling would not have changed the outcome. The TTAB’s decision would not have
been preclusive on the District Court for the Middle District of Florida because the
“ordinary elements of issue preclusion” were not met because the TTAB did not
99 Freedom S&L Ass’n v. Way, 583 F. Supp. 544 (M.D. Fla. 1984); Freedom Sav. & Loan Assoc.
v. Way, 757 F.2d 1176, 1179 (5th Cir. 1985).
100 Freedom Sav., 757 F.2d at 1179.
101 Id.
102 When determining if there is a likelihood of confusion, the Eleventh Circuit looks towards
the following seven factors: “[i] similarity of design, [ii] similarity of product, [iii] the type of mark at
issue, [iv] identity of consumer, [v] similarity of advertising media, [vi] defendant’s intent, and
[vii] actual confusion.” Freedom S&L, 583 F. Supp. at 559 (citing Citibank, N.A. v. Citibank Group,
Inc., 724 F.2d 1540 (11th Cir. 1984)).
103 Freedom S&L, 583 F. Supp. at 551.
104 Id. at 549-550. Additionally, the court found no “credible evidence of actual confusion.” Id.
at 551. The district court noted that while both companies’ services were “complementary to each
other,” Federal Savings offers real estate brokerage services under a different name. Id. Therefore,
there was no “similarity of services between [Way’s] business and [Federal Savings’] operations done
under the word ‘Freedom.’” Id. The district court also noted that after the TTAB’s decision, Way
changed his business’ name “to further distinguish it from [Federal Savings’ mark.” Id. When
weighing the similarity of advertising, the court stated that while Federal Savings advertises on a
larger scale, “both parties advertise in a similar media” but there is “only a slight similarity.” Id.
105 Freedom Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Way, 757 F.2d 1176 (11th Cir. 1985).
106 Id. at 1180.
The Eleventh Circuit “has decided that Congress limited the . . . collateral
estoppel effect to be given the decision of the TTAB because the Lanham Act provides for extensive
judicial involvement in the registration and protection of trademarks.” Id.
107 Id. at 1186.
108 Id. at 1183.
109 Freedom Savings offers its real estate brokerage services under the name Sun Bay Realty
Company. Federal Sav. & Loan, 757 F.2d at 1183.
110 Id. at 1184. Way operates out of a house and Freedom Savings operates in a commercial
banking building. Id. The Eleventh Circuit also determined that the identity of customers weighed
in favor of neither party and was therefore irrelevant. Id. at 1185.
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adjudicate the same issue as the one before the district court. The TTAB resolved the
issue of likelihood of confusion between Freedom Savings’ FREEDOM mark and
Way’s FREEDOM REALTY mark.111 However, the trademark litigation suit in the
district court involved Freedom Savings’ FREEDOM mark and Way’s Vernon Way’s
Freedom Realty business.112 So, while the TTAB’s decision was rendered in a
judicial capacity and a final judgment was reached, both parties were not given a fair
opportunity to litigate the issues because different issues were before each respective
venue. Since the issue before the TTAB was not the same issue as the one before the
district court, B&B Hardware’s ruling would not have changed the outcome of this
case.
C. Second Circuit
The Second Circuit considered the issue of whether a TTAB decision was
preclusive in Levy v. Kosher Overseers Association of America.113 In this case, the
issue revolved around two similar “kosher certification marks.” 114 Levy used its
certification mark, an encircled K (“Circle-K”), since 1936 and subsequently
registered its mark with the USPTO on September 7, 1965. 115 On May 26, 1989,
Kosher Overseers Association of America, Inc. (“Kosher Overseers”) filed an
application with the USPTO to register its certification mark, an “encircled version of
the half-moon K.”116 Once Kosher Overseers’ mark was published in the Official
Gazette, Levy opposed the registration on the grounds that Kosher Overseers’ mark
was so similar to its mark that it was likely to cause confusion.117
After reviewing the record,118 the TTAB sustained Levy’s objection and refused
Kosher Overseers’ application.119 The TTAB ruled that confusion was likely because
“consumers will be likely to confuse the source of the respective certification marks”
and that the two marks were insufficiently different. 120 Kosher Overseers attempted

111 Freedom Federal Savings and Loan Association v. Vernon Way, Jr., 217 U.S.P.Q. 971, 973
(TTAB 1981).
112 Freedom S&L Ass’n v. Way, 583 F. Supp. 544 (M.D. Fl. 1984).
113 104 F.3d 38 (2d Cir. 1997).
114 Levy, 104 F.3d at 39. Under trademark law, certification marks are treated the same as
trademarks. Id.; 15 U.S.C. § 1054 (1999). Kosher certification marks are used to designate food
that complies with Judaism’s dietary laws. Levy, 104 F.3d at 39. “Kosher certification agencies
employ their own standards . . . it is important for a consumer to recognize the marks of the
certification agenc[y] he trusts.” Id.
115 K, Reg. No. 795,748; Levy v. Kosher Overseers Ass’n of Am., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9262, *3
(S.D. NY July 8, 1994).
116 K, Registration No. 1,605,159; Levy, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9262, *3.
117 Don Yoel Levy and Eliezer Levy, d.b.a. O.K. Laboratories v. Kosher Overseers Assoc. of Am.,
Inc., 1991 TTAB LEXIS 68, *2 (TTAB December 11, 1991).
118 The record consisted of both parties’ testimony, Levy’s Circle-K registration, and Kosher
Overseers’ application file. Don Yoel Levy, 1991 TTAB LEXIS at *2.
119 Id. at *8.
120 Id. at *6-7. Both marks “consist of the letter K within a circle” and are shown in a “relatively
small size on the products so marked.” Id. at *7. The TTAB noted that only after careful
examination would a consumer be able to note the difference between Kosher Overseers’ and Levy’s
marks. Id. at *6-7.
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to argue that the circle around Levy’s Circle-K mark was generic and had not
obtained secondary meaning.121
The TTAB rejected this argument and stated Kosher Overseers’ arguments
“constitute[d] an impermissible attack on [Levy’s] registration, . . . [which was] over
twenty-five years old,” and that the record does not support Kosher Overseers’
position.122 Finally, Kosher Overseers tried to argue that there was a different
likelihood of confusion test for certification marks. 123 Again the TTAB rejected this
argument by stating:
While [Kosher Overseers] suggested that there may be a different test
of likelihood of confusion in cases involving certification marks, we
find no statutory or judicial authority for the position. The same
standards applied to trademarks and service marks govern whether a
certification mark is likely to cause confusion under Section 2(d). 124
Kosher Overseers continued to use its half-moon K mark and Levy subsequently
brought an action for trademark infringement.125 Levy asserted that Kosher
Overseers was barred under collateral estoppel from defending the trademark
infringement action.126 Kosher Overseers argued that collateral estoppel should not
apply because “no court has applied collateral estoppel to unappealed decisions of the
TTAB.”127 The District Court for the Southern District of New York stated that
“whether TTAB decisions may have collateral estoppel . . . rests on whether the
TTAB has considered the marks in light of their market context.”128 The district
court went on to hold that the elements of collateral estoppel were satisfied by the
TTAB opposition proceeding,129 and that the “TTAB considered the issue of
marketplace essential to an infringement action.”130 The district court ruled that
Kosher Overseers was barred under collateral estoppel from defending the
trademark infringement action and found in favor of Levy. 131
Kosher Overseers appealed the district court’s ruling to the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit.132 The Second Circuit ruled that the district court erred in
Id.
Id.
123 Id. at *8.
124 Don Yoel Levy, 1991 TTAB LEXIS at *8.
125 Levy v. Kosher Overseers Ass’n of Am., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9262 (S.D. NY July 8, 1994).
126 Id. at *6.
127 Id. at *6-7. The district court rejected this argument stating the “Jim Beam court did not
rule that a TTAB proceeding could never have collateral estoppel effect on subsequent litigation.”
Id. at *10 (emphasis added).
128 Id. at *15.
129 The second circuit uses a four-prong test in determining whether collateral estoppel applies:
(i) the issues in both proceedings must be identical, (ii) the issue in prior
proceedings must have been actually litigated and decided, (iii) there must have
been a full and fair opportunity for the litigation in the prior proceeding, and
(iv) the issue previously litigated must have been necessary to support a valid and
final judgment on the merits.
Levy, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9262 at *16 (citing Beck v. Levering, 947 F.3d 639, 642 (2d Cir. 1991)).
130 Id. at *18.
131 Id. at *20.
132 Levy v. Kosher Overseers Ass’n of Am., 104 F.3d 38, 39 (2d Cir. 1997).
121
122
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applying collateral estoppel.133 The Second Circuit explained that “the standards
governing ‘likelihood of confusion’ in . . . opposition proceedings before the
TTAB . . . can be different than the ‘likelihood of confusion’ standard [used] in
trademark infringement actions in district court[s].” 134
The Second Circuit
concluded that the TTAB’s analysis was not identical to the Polaroid analysis.135
Additionally, the Second Circuit stated that the TTAB did not look at other relevant
Polaroid factors but only considered the similarity of the two marks. 136 The Second
Circuit concluded that collateral estoppel should not have been applied. 137
Applying B&B Hardware’s ruling to this case, the TTAB’s decision should have
been preclusive. The Second Circuit’s reasoning that the TTAB uses a different set of
factors for likelihood of confusion138 was clearly rejected by the Supreme Court in
B&B Hardware.139 In reaching its decision, the TTAB compared the two marks’
appearance, the commercial use, and the marks’ usage in the marketplace. 140
Specifically, the TTAB examined the “manner in which [the marks] appeared on the
packaging [in the marketplace].”141 The TTAB considered actual marketplace usage
and the usages before the TTAB were materially the same as the ones before the
district court.142 Therefore, the TTAB’s decision would have been preclusive and the
District Court for the Southern District of New York was correct in applying
collateral estoppel.

Id. at 39.
Id. at 41. The Second Circuit further explained that opposition proceedings are determined
by the mark as stated in the application “regardless of actual usage” and many oppositions are
decided by “a limited comparison of the registered or applied-for format and goods without regard
for their marketplace manner of use.” Id. at 41-42 (quoting 2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON
TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION, § 32:31 (2d ed. 1984)).
135 The Second Circuit analyzes likelihood of confusion under the eight Polaroid factors:
(i) strength of plaintiff’s mark, (ii) degree of similarity between the plaintiff’s and
defendant’s marks, (iii) proximity of the products, (iv) likelihood of plaintiff will
‘bridge the gap’ between the two products, (v) actual confusion between the two
marks, (vi) defendant’s good faith in adopting its mark, (vii) quality of the
defendant’s products, and (viii) sophistication of the buyers of the plaintiff’s and
defendant’s goods or services.
Levy, 104 F.3d at 42; The Sports Authority, Inc. v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 89 F.3d 955, 960 (2d Cir.
1996). No one Polaroid factor is determinative. Levy, 104 F.3d at 43.
136 Levy, 104 F.3d at 43.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 42.
139 B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Indus., 135 S. Ct. 1293, 1307 (2015).
The likelihood of
confusion factors used by the various circuits and the TTAB are “not fundamentally different and
[the] minor variations in the application of what is in essence the same legal standard do[es] not
defeat preclusion.” Id.
140 Levy v. Kosher Overseers Ass’n of Am., 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9262, *7 (S.D. NY July 7,
1994).
141 Levy, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9262, at *4-5. “Both marks, consisting of the letter K within a
circle, are displayed in relatively small size on the products . . . only after careful examination would
a consumer be able to discern the slight difference. Don Yoel Levy, 1991 TTAB LEXIS at *7.
142 In B&B Hardware, the Supreme Court stated de novo challenges are available for parties
“dissatisfied with the TTAB’s decision.” 135 S. Ct. at 1306. The fact that Kosher Overseers did not
appeal the TTAB’s decision does not change the outcome as there is a specific remedy for parties
who are dissatisfied with the ruling.
133
134
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IV. PROPOSAL
The Supreme Court’s holding in B&B Hardware seems to allow parties in a
TTAB decision to control whether or not it is preclusive. 143 This section proposes
strategies in the TTAB that may allow a decision to become preclusive or not and
poses questions that B&B Hardware v. Hargis Industries did not answer.
Under certain circumstances, a party may want the TTAB’s decision to be
preclusive on subsequent district court litigation. At the outset, when filing a
trademark application, parties need to consider narrower goods and services
definition in the trademark application. 144 For example, if the application is a
use-based application, the goods and services definition should accurately reflect how
the mark is actually used in commerce.145 Furthermore, parties should introduce
marketplace surveys and evidence of use to persuade the TTAB to consider actual
marketplace usage in order to make the decision preclusive. 146
On the other hand, there are strategies to prevent a TTAB’s decision from
becoming preclusive in district court. If an opposition proceeding has begun and
seems like it is going against the applicant’s favor, the applicant may withdraw the
application and take his chances in a federal district court without risking preclusion
from the TTAB’s decision.147 Alternatively, a party can challenge the TTAB’s scope
of discovery or that the evidence of the mark’s use is different than what the TTAB
considered.148 Furthermore, a strong way of making sure that a TTAB’s decision will
not be preclusive on the district court is to make sure the issue before the district
court is different than the issue decided by the TTAB. 149 It is important to note,
however, that withholding arguments in the TTAB could backfire in district court if
the district court applies issue preclusion.150 Parties dissatisfied with the TTAB’s
decision are more likely to see de novo review.151

143 Uli Widmaier, Pattishall McAuliffe Newbury Hilliard & Geraldson LLP, Supreme Court
holds that issues decided by the TTAB May be preclusive in Federal Court (May 25, 2015).
144 Hon. Gerard Rogers, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, IPO Annual Meeting: TTAB Update
and Implications of B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc. for Corporations (September 29,
2015).
145 Id.
146 Michael Metteauer, Norton Rose Fulbright US, LLP, IPO Annual Meeting: TTAB Update
and Implications of B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc. for Corporations (September 29,
2015); Andrew L. Deutsch and Tamar Y. Duvdevani, DLA Piper: Life after B&B Hardware v. Hargis
Industries—Implications for Brand Owners (May 4, 2015).
147 Katherine Basile, Reed Smith, IPO Annual Meeting: TTAB Update and Implications of B&B
Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc. for Corporations (September 29, 2015).
148 Kenneth L. Wilton, Seyfarth Shaw, American Intellectual Property Law Association:
Debriefing B&B: Takeaways and Tips on Issue Preclusion in Trademark Litigation (April 23, 2015).
By challenging the scope of discovery a party can argue that they were not given a full and fair
opportunity to litigate and that issue preclusion should not apply.
149 Id. See e.g. Am. Heritage Life Ins. Co. v. Heritage Life Ins. Co., 494 F.2d 3 (5th Cir. 1974)
(stating that the issue before the TTAB was priority of the marks while the issue before the district
court was trademark infringement and a likelihood of confusion between the two marks).
150 Hon. Gerard Rogers, U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, IPO Annual Meeting: TTAB Update
and Implications of B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis Industries, Inc. for Corporations (September 29,
2015).
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At the end of the day, “Board decisions based on likelihood of
confusion . . . should be given preclusive effect on a case-by-case basis.”152 When
issue preclusion does apply, it will be a powerful tool. 153 Ultimately, “[t]he full
impact of B&B Hardware will become clearer as the courts and the TTAB begin
applying the decision.”154
The Supreme Court’s opinion did not address all possibilities of trademark
proceedings and several questions remain. Traditionally, the TTAB suspends its
proceedings when the parties are involved in a civil action in federal district court. 155
Will the TTAB still stay its proceedings when a simultaneous district court
proceeding is happening on the same issue? Will issue preclusion in federal district
courts apply to Patent Trial and Appeal Board decisions? 156 Will the TTAB’s
findings on other issue be found to be preclusive in federal district court litigation? 157
For example, will TTAB decisions on priority, descriptiveness, or genericness be
preclusive? Additionally, will a cancellation proceeding be preclusive in federal
district court?158 Will ex parte proceedings be preclusive in federal district court? 159
Similarly, will a TTAB’s default judgment be a fully and fairly litigated issue and
therefore preclusive?160
Will opposition proceedings involving intent to use
applications be preclusive?161
V. CONCLUSION
This comment looked at the effect the Supreme Court’s holding in B&B
Hardware v. Hargis Industries, Inc.162 will have on trademark litigation. By
applying this holding to prior cases, we see that the scope of this holding is a narrow
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155 TBMP, supra note 14, § 510.02. “Whenever it shall come to the attention of the Trademark
Trial and Appeal Board that a party or parties to a pending case are engaged in a civil action or
another board proceeding which may have a bearing on the case, proceedings before the Board may
be suspended until termination of the civil action or other Board proceeding.” 37 C.F.R. § 2.117(a).
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(April 23, 2015)
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(June 2, 2015). Will a TTAB’s decision on an opposition proceeding revolving around property be
preclusive in district court?
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one that, as Justice Ginsberg noted in her concurrence,163 will not apply to the
majority of trademark registrations.
The true implications of B&B Hardware remain to be seen and many questions
still remain on the scope and application of this decision.

163

B&B Hardware, 135 S. Ct. at 1306, 1310 (Ginsburg, J., concurring).

